The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius

p. 128

‘You are right,’ she said, ‘but if someone thinks a particular conclusion hard to accept, he ought to show either that some false assumption has preceded it or that the way the arguments have been marshalled does not necessarily produce the conclusion. Otherwise, provided he agrees to what has preceded, there is absolutely no ground for arguing about the conclusion….’

‘What is it?’ I asked.

‘That the wicked are happier if they suffer punishment than if they are unrestrained by any just retribution. And I do not have in mind what you may think, namely that wickedness is corrected by punishment and returned to the path of right by the fear of punishment, and is also an example to others to avoid punishable actions. No, I think there is another way in which the wicked are more unhappy if they go unpunished, apart from any consideration of the corrective effect of punishment or its value as a deterrent to others….Now, if someone’s misery is offset by something good, he is happier than someone else whose misery is pure and undiluted by any admixture of good, isn’t he?’

This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a comment